



Michael E. Porter is recognized as a leading authority on strategy and competitiveness. 
His works have generated analytical tools used by business schools, managers, and public policy 
makers: fi ve-forces analysis, generic strategies, the value chain, activity systems, the national 
diamond and industry innovation clusters. Broader applications of Porter’s analytical frameworks 
have included health care, non-profi t organization strategy, economic development of inner 
cities, national competitiveness, clusters and innovation capacity, cross-industry linkages, 
environmental quality and competitiveness, and regional economic development (Institute for 
Strategy and Competitiveness, 2008).
Prior to Porter, strategic management rested on the SWOT framework – strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats – developed by the general management group at 
Harvard (Andrews, 1971). This approach involved checklists of factors to assess opportunities and 
threats in the organization’s external environment and strengths and weakness in its internal 
environment. Although widely used, the SWOT framework lacked an analytical foundation. 
Other approaches such as Chandler’s strategy and structure framework (1962) supplemented 
SWOT, drawing on business history to show how a fi rm’s strategy and structure responded to 
changes in the external environment.
Porter’s Competitive Strategy (1980) transformed strategic management in six ways. 
First, it applied microeconomics and industrial organization (IO) concepts to business level 
strategy to assess the attractiveness of an industry and positions within an industry. In the 
1970s Porter had himself contributed to the IO literature, analyzing the relationship between 
fi rm performance and external factors including exit barriers, mobility barriers, branding, and 
market structure (Porter, 1976; Caves and Porter, 1977; Stonehouse and Snowdon, 2007). 
Second, the work turned the IO structure, conduct and performance approach on its head.  IO 
had identifi ed barriers that reduced competition at the industry level. The new work asked: 
how could managers manipulate mobility barriers to achieve above average returns?  Third, it 
extended the analysis of competitive forces beyond immediate rivals to include the power of 
suppliers and buyers, the threat of new entrants and the attraction of substitutes. The relative 
power of these forces determined the attractiveness and average returns of an industry. Fourth, it 
outlined a set of generic strategies that could create a long run defensible position with superior 
returns in a given industry: overall cost leadership, differentiation and focus.  Fifth, it proposed 
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fi ve generic industry environments - fragmented, emerging, 
mature, declining and global - to demonstrate how the level of 
industry concentration, the stage of the industry life cycle and 
the extent of international competition shape competitive forces 
and strategies. Finally, it explored the existence of strategic 
groups within an industry and their implications for strategy, 
showing that there was more than one way to be profi table in 
a heterogeneous industry structure. Rivals could succeed by 
competing along quite different strategic dimensions. 
Beyond industry analysis, Competitive Strategy also 
offered insights on the scope of the fi rm, on game theory 
applications to strategy, and on competitor analysis. Chapter 
14 on vertical integration explored both the advantages and 
disadvantages of backward and forward integration in different 
industry contexts.  Chapter 4 on market signals (4) and chapter 
15 on capacity expansion (15) applied game theory concepts to 
competitive strategy: credible threats, retaliation, commitment, 
reputation, trust, pre-emption, rational versus irrational stances, 
and signaling. The model for competitor analysis (chapter 3) 
explores how a rival’s capabilities, assumptions, future goals and 
current strategy affect its response profi le. The model includes 
the rival’s current competitive strategy, but goes well beyond 
this to examine cognitive factors (assumptions of the rival), 
motivation (future goals) and resources (capabilities).
A number of debates have surrounded the fi ve-forces 
analysis: whether it omits other relevant forces, whether it 
matters how industry boundaries are drawn, and whether it 
continues to be relevant in innovative and highly internationalized 
competitive environments. Nominees for additions to the 
fi ve-forces have included government and “complementors”: 
products or services to be used with the industry’s product, such 
as fuel service stations for automobiles or software for video 
game consoles.  While such additions are found in strategic 
management textbooks, Porter himself objected to adding a sixth 
or seventh force, arguing that complementors and government 
are not additional competitive forces, but rather factors that act 
through the original fi ve forces: rivals, suppliers, buyers, new 
entrants and substitutes (Porter, 2008).
On whether it matters where one draws industry 
boundaries, Porter declared confi dently in chapter 1 that this 
mattered little as the fi ve-forces analysis would provide the 
needed tools to assess the attractiveness of any industry.  Yet 
one might argue where one draws industry boundaries does 
matter in a world where innovation and falling trade barriers 
reveal new rivals, entrants and substitutes.  Industry boundaries 
appear more porous and subjective currently than in the more 
stable protected industries of post-war national economies. The 
fi ve forces analysis requires considerably more effort and skill 
to apply in a globalizing innovative context.   
The industry structure approach to strategy, with its 
focus on the external environment, is often contrasted with 
the resource-based view of competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992) which represents the 
dominant framework for analyzing the internal strengths and 
weaknesses of the original SWOT framework.  Proponents of the 
resource-based view argue fi rm-specifi c resources, capabilities 
and/or competences rather than generic strategies in a given 
industry structure are the true source of competitive advantage. 
Porter has criticized the resource-based view for its “nagging 
imprecision”  (Stonehouse and Snowdon, 2007).  It is true that 
the resource-based view suffers from not having a rigorous 
supporting subfi eld such as industrial organization offered 
competitive strategy.  Yet Porter himself has contributed to 
internal perspectives on strategy with the value-chain and 
activity system concepts.
Indeed, Porter’s contributions to strategic management 
have alternated between external and internal perspectives. 
Competitive Strategy (Porter, 1980) focused on industry structure 
in the external environment of the fi rm. The prescription to fi nd 
attractive industry assumed the fi rm possessed the resources or 
capabilities needed to compete in that industry, or the fi nancial 
resources to acquire a fi rm with the requisite capabilities.
Competitive Strategy (Porter, 1980) contains a strong 
claim about generic strategies that a fi rm risks getting “stuck 
in the middle” if it tries to pursue simultaneously a low-cost 
advantage and differentiation. Surprisingly, this claim does 
not appear to rest on analysis of industry structure, where 
one might indeed fi nd fi rms that simultaneously offer high 
perceived value to consumers at relative low cost to the fi rm as 
Japanese automobile fi rms did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Instead, “stuck in the middle” derives from Porter’s analysis 
of the “different resources and skills” required for successful 
implementation of overall cost leadership – process engineering 
skills, low cost distribution, tight cost control systems, high 
capital investments – versus those required for differentiation – 
strong marketing skills, product engineering, strong cooperation 
with marketing channels, strong coordination among R&D, 
product development and marketing, ability to attract creative 
people, and qualitative control systems (Porter, 1980).
Competitive Advantage (Porter, 1985), his second major work, 
had an internal perspective, focusing on the fi rm’s value chain. It 
argued that the appropriate scope of the fi rm, which primary and 
supporting activities should be done internally and which should 
be outsourced or shared with other organizations, depended on 
whether the activities were essential for developing or maintaining 
the fi rm’s competitive advantage. Those activities deemed central 
for competitive advantage needed to be owned by the fi rm.
In his third major work, Competitive Advantage of Nations 
(1990), Porter turned his attention again to the external 
environment, but also shifted his primary attention from what 
yielded above average returns for the individual fi rm to what 
factors made an industry competitive internationally. Whereas 
the 1980 work advised managers to seek an “attractive industry” 
with mobility barriers and avoid spoiling the industry by driving 
down profi tability through vigorous competition, the 1990 
work pointed to vigorous domestic competition as a vital factor 
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to achieve the quality and innovation an industry needed to 
compete internationally. Whereas government had been a 
background factor operating through the fi ve forces in the 1980 
work and whereas the assumption of a relatively stable industry 
structure left little to chance, in the 1990 work both government 
and chance were important supplementary factors in the 
“national diamond.”  The national diamond consisted of four 
key components: fi rm rivalry based on strategy and structure, 
related and supporting industries, input factor conditions and 
demand conditions.  In the national diamond, government can 
play a positive role by stimulating competition, improving factor 
conditions – infrastructure, education – or by setting quality 
standards.  Similarly, whereas knowledgeable customers wield 
power that reduces industry profi tability in the fi ve-forces 
analysis, sophisticated demanding customers foster innovation 
in the national diamond. Chance enters into the original factor 
conditions and into the timing of innovations.  Governments 
have occasionally used the national diamond as a justifi cation 
for industrial strategy, but Porter himself strongly objects to 
governments “picking winners” and argues governments can 
instead help improve factor conditions such as infrastructure 
or education or set quality, safety and environmental standards 
that have cross-industry benefi ts.  
While the national diamond framework noted the 
competitive benefi ts of regional industrial clusters, Porter 
maintained that competitive advantage rests on integrating key 
activities within the fi rm rather than relying on alliances and 
other cooperative strategies.  Capabilities developed internally 
were harder for others to imitate. Alliances involved risks of 
losing control over inside knowledge and posed challenges 
in strategic and organizational coordination with a partner 
with differing goals. Porter suggested alliances could be left 
to second-tier competitors struggling to catch up or used as 
temporary devices when an industry faced uncertainties of a 
major shift (Demers et al., 1997).  
In the article “What is Strategy?”, Porter (1996) returned 
to an internal perspective focusing again on the competitive 
advantage of the individual fi rm. He argued that differentiation 
based on a unique constellation of activities offers a more 
sustainable basis for competitive advantage than a low cost 
advantaged based on improving operational effectiveness. 
These “activity systems” refl ect deployment of a fi rm’s resources 
to create a differentiated and diffi cult to imitate competitive 
position.  Activity systems are therefore closely related to both 
the resource-based view and the 1985 value chain framework 
(Ghemawat et al., 1999). The article’s claim that Japanese 
fi rms lacked competitive strategy and pursued only operational 
effectiveness, an advantage eroded by imitation, provoked 
debate and refl ection among Japanese managers and policy 
makers.  This led to the establishment of the annual Porter Prize 
for Japanese companies that have achieved superior profi tability 
though a unique competitive strategy based on innovation in 
products or processes.
Internationalization and innovation have probably 
lessened the power of the fi ve-forces analysis to provide clear 
guidelines for competitive strategy. Yet managers still need to 
be mindful of its applicability, and it can also help understand 
what has changed and what remains constant in industries 
undergoing transitions including globalization. Similarly, Porter’s 
industry innovation clusters continue to be relevant for strategy-
making in dynamic environments where learning and networks 
are important for developing competitive advantage.
REFERENCES
ANDREWS, K.R.  1971. The concept of corporate strategy. Homewood, 
Illinois, Irwin, 132 p.
BARNEY, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. 
Journal of Management, 17(1):99-120.
CAVES, R.E.; PORTER, M.E. 1977. From entry barriers to mobility 
barriers: Conjectural decisions and contrived deterrence to new 
competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91(2):241-261.
CHANDLER, A.D. 1962. Strategy and structure: chapters in the history of 
the industrial enterprise. Cambridge, MIT Press, 463 p.
DEMERS, C.; HAFSI, T.; JORGENSEN, J.J.; MOLZ, R. 1997. Industry 
dynamics of cooperative strategy:  Dominant and peripheral 
games. In:  P.W. BEAMISH; J.P. KILLING (eds.), Cooperative 
strategies:  North American perspectives. San Francisco,  New 
Lexington Press, p. 111-132.
GHEMAWAT, P.; COLLIS, D.; PISANO, G.; RIVKIN, J. 1999 . Strategy and 
the Business Landscape  Reading, Addison-Wesley, 176 p.
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVENESS. 2008. Harvard 
Business School. Available at: http://www.isc.hbs.edu/. Accessed 
on: 02/09/2008.
MAHONEY, J.T.; PANDIAN, J.R. 1992. The resource-based view within the 
conversation of strategic management. Strategic Management 
Journal, 13(5):363-380.
PORTER, M.E. 1976. Interbrand choice, media mix and market 
performance. The American Economic Review, 66(2):398-406.
PORTER, M.E. 1980. Competitive strategy; techniques for analyzing 
industries and competitors. New York, Free Press, 397 p.
PORTER, M.E. 1985. Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining 
superior performance. New York, Free Press, 592 p.
PORTER, M.E. 1990. The competitive advantage of nations. New York, 
Free Press, 896 p.
PORTER, M.E. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 
74(6):61-78.
PORTER, M.E. 2008. The fi ve competitive forces that shape strategy. 
Harvard Business Review, 86(1):78-93.
STONEHOUSE, G.; SNOWDON, B. 2007. Competitive advantage revisited: 
Michael Porter on strategy and competitiveness. Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 16(3):256-273.
JAN J. JÖRGENSEN
Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University
1001 Sherbrooke St. West,
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1G5, Canada 
236a238_RS01_Jorgensen[rev_OK].indd   238 26/12/2008   20:38:12
